NEHRU’S speeches on KASHMIR

THE SWEEP OF HISTORY

(A statement made in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, March 5, 1948.)

From, Independence and After, A collection of the more important speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949. The Publications Division, August, 1949

SIR, I crave your leave and the indulgence of the House to make a statement on Kashmir. I would beg the House to bear with me for a while, because there is a great deal to say, however briefly I might say I, --  not that I am going to make any sensational disclosures, there is nothing very secret about what I am going to say and the facts have appeared in the public Press and in other places frequently enough during the last few months. Nevertheless, it is right that I should place before the House some kind of a consecutive account of what has happened. In order to lessen my task and to help Members of the House, we have prepared a White Paper on Kashmir which will be distributed to members. This White Paper does not bring matters right up-to-date. It is practically up to the period of the reference to the Security Council. It is not an absolutely complete paper in the sense that every telegram, and every letter is included, but, on the whole, most of the messages that passed between us and the Government of Pakistan, or connected messages have been given in this White Paper.

Now, before I speak on this particular Kashmir issue, I should like by your leave to say a few words on a wider issue of which the Kashmir issue is a part. We have been living through strenuous days; we have been passing through a period of dynamic history in India. Much has happened during the past six months, much that was good and much that was very bad. But, perhaps, when the history of India comes to be written, when much of the horror of today has been forgotten, one of the biggest things that mill be mentioned will be the change that has come over India and that is coming over India in regard to the Indian States. We see something very remarkable happening. It is perhaps difficult for us who live in the middle of this change to appreciate the bigness of what has happened. But it is the upsetting in a very curious way -- a peaceful way --of a structure that has endured in India for the past 130 or 140 years, more or less ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

We see the sweep of history suddenly coming, the big broom of history, and changing this 130 year old structure and putting something else in its place. We cannot definitely and absolutely say what the final and precise outcome of all this will be, though the picture is clearing up fairly rapidly. It would almost appear that there is the hand of destiny at work. What is happening is nothing that we did not expect. In fact, many of us for many years past have had certain objectives in regard to the Indian States and we have worked for them both through our political and other organizations in India, through the people of the States, through the people of the provinces and otherwise. And, on the whole, what is happening today is in line with the objectives we had laid down. So it is not surprising. Yet, may I confess to you, Sir, that even I who have been rather intimately connected with the States peoples’ movement for many years, if I had been asked six months ago what the course of developments would be in the next six months since then, I would have hesitated to say that such rapid changes would take place. Many factors have gone to bring about these rapid changes. Ultimately, I suppose, they are the forces of history working, -- the unleashing of all manner of forces which had been repressed for so long. For we had during these 130 years a strange phenomenon. The British Government had constructed a State structure in the course of a quarter of a century in the early days of the nineteenth century. Whether it fitted in, in reality, with conditions then existing in India or not, it is a little difficult to say what would have happened minus the British Government. Anyhow, the dominant power of the British created this system, no doubt for their own advantage as they thought fit. That system continued, not because of any inherent strength, as is obvious today, but because of the continuance of that dominant power, of the paramount power as it was called. All manner of changes were going on in India and in the outside world and yet the Indian States structure continued. Many of us said that it was rather archaic, it was out of date, it had to change and must change and so on. But now that the protecting hand of a foreign Government has been removed, the repressions also are removed. The forces that had been kept in check suddenly began to function and we see them in action, in rapid action. The forces are there of course; they have not been curbed by any of us, but I think in the manner of dealing with this situation, an intricate and difficult situation -- this House will agree with me that we owe a debt of gratitude to my friend and colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister.

So it is in this mighty context of a changing India in regard to the States that we have to view any particular aspect of it. We saw unfortunately six months back the partition of India, the splitting up of India, a part of India going out of India. Immediately after that process of cutting off, another process started, or rather we have always had these two processes the process -- of integrating India. We have seen this process of integrating India going one in regard to the States, and not only in regard to the States but, to some extent, even in regard to the provinces, but much more so in regard to the States. So these two things have gone on together -- a process of cutting away and a process of integration and in the balance it is difficult to say how far we have gained and how far we have lost. It is difficult to say also how far this process of integration will go and whither it will take us ultimately. Nevertheless, it is interesting for us living through this rather strange and dynamic period of India’s history, to look at it in some perspective, not as actors in the drama but rather as historians looking back on what has happened. The historian who looks back will no doubt consider this integration of the States into India as one of the dominant phases of India’s history.

Well, Sir, the process is taking various shapes. There has been an actual merger of a large number of small States with India there has been a bringing together of a number of States into Unions of States which form units of the Union of India and a certain number of major States remain as separate entities. But what is equally important -- and if I may say so, even more important -- is not this integration externally but the inner integration; that is, the growth of democratic institutions and responsible government in the States, because that brings about a real integration; not at the top lever of government but at the level of the people. Both these processes have gone on and both these processes, may I remind the House, are in line with the objectives far which we have laboured for many years.

Now, it is in this context of changes in the States system that this House to consider the particular case of Kashmir, and it stands apart and many other factors come into play. Today India two States stand quite apart from the rest in regard to these processes. These States are Hyderabad and Kashmir. I am not going at this moment to say anything about Hyderabad. In regard to Kashmir, it stands apart for many reasons, partly because it has got entangled in external politics, that is to say, it has got entangled in the relations between India and Pakistan and so the two essentially State issues there are somewhat submerged. It is an odd thing that it should get so entangled. That it got entangled is not odd, but the manner of its entanglement, because the Government of Pakistan have assured us time and again that they have nothing to do with the recent events in Kashmir, raids and invasions, etc. -- they go on repeating that; nevertheless, they seek to profit by those events. They seek political advantages out of those events, so that while disclaiming all responsibility for what has happened they do want to share in whatever they might get out of it. Anyhow, the Kashmir problem stands apart.

But for the moment, leaving out this external implication of the Kashmir problem, if you consider it, it is essentially the same problem, that is to say, a problem of the growth of the freedom of the people and the growth also of a new integration. Now, we have been aiming, the Government of India and the States Ministry, at the growth of this inner freedom of the people of all the States. If many of the States have agreed to merge with India or come into closer contact with her, it is not because the States Ministry took a big stick and threatened them with consequences. It is because of those forces, arising from the people, and other forces, and fundamentally the sudden withdrawal of an external force which had kept the States together, or rather the States system together, the might of the British Government and the sanctions behind it. That disappearing, immediately the structure began to collapse and it is an astonishing thing -- this sudden collapse of a structure which seemed so solid just a few months or a year ago -- not surprising to those who knew the facts, but undoubtedly surprising to those people who take a superficial view of things. So essentially we have been aiming at the freedom of the people, knowing and realizing that ultimately it will be for the people of the States to decide what their future will be. We are not going to compel them. We do not propose to compel them, and indeed we cannot compel them in the context of the world today in any State. There are other compulsions, the compulsions of geography. That is true; one cannot ignore it. There are many other compulsions. And naturally in considering the problem, we, that is, the Government of India, have always to consider the interests of India as a whole, the interests of India in regard to security, defence, etc., but apart from that, we do not wish to exercise any other compulsion in the slightest, over the growth of freedom. In fact, we want to encourage it in the people of the States. We know well that if there is that growth of freedom and freedom of decision by the people of the States, then it will be a powerful factor in bringing them nearer to our people, because we hope that whatever constitution we may adopt in India, it will be based completely on the will of the people.

Now, may I say a few words before I go on to the Kashmir issue and that is this: in this matter I feel a slight difficulty, because the matter is being or going to be discussed again in the Security Council of the United Nations and I would not like to say anything which might be construed, shall I say, into putting difficulties in the way of coming to a settlement either in the Security Council or elsewhere. Because we earnestly desire a settlement, we earnestly desire that these great forces should be allowed to function normally and to achieve their results; any other result will be an artificial result. We cannot impose a result -- certainly Pakistan cannot impose a result. Ultimately there is no doubt in my mind that in Kashmir as elsewhere, the people of Kashmir will decide finally, and all that we wish is that they should have freedom of decision without any external compulsion.

Now, there is one other factor which I should like to put before the House in regard to Kashmir. We have become too used in India, unfortunately, to thinking of every problem or many problems in terms of communalism, of Hindu versus Muslim or Hindu and Sikh versus Muslim and so on. That has been an unfortunate legacy of ours, and the extent to which it took us cannot be forgotten by us nor the tragedies that it has led to. We are trying, I hope, to get rid of the spirit of communal India at least. We hope to put an end to it, not suddenly perhaps, but certainly fairly rapidly.

Now, in this context of communal conflict the case of Kashmir stands apart because Kashmir is not a case of communal conflict; it may be a case of political conflict, if you like; it may be a case of any other conflict, but it is essentially not a case of communal conflict. Therefore, this struggle in Kashmir, although it has brought great suffering in its train to the people of Kashmir and placed a burden on the Government of India and the people of India, nevertheless it stands out as a sign of hope that there we see a certain co-operation, combination and coordination of certain elements, Hindu and Muslim and Sikh and others on an equal level, and for a political fight for their own freedom. I wish to stress this because it is continually being said by our opponents and critics on the other side that this is a communal affair and that we are there to support the Hindus or the Sikh minorities as against the Muslim masses of Kashmir. Nothing can be more fantastically untrue. We could not for an instant send our armies and we would not be there if we were not supported by very large sections of the population, which means the Muslims of Kashmir. We would not have gone there in spite of the invitation of the Maharaja of Kashmir, if that invitation had not been backed by the representatives of the people of Kashmir and may I say to the House that in spite of our armies having functioned with great gallantry, even our armies could not have succeeded except with the help and co-operation of the people of Kashmir. Now, we are blamed by people outside, beyond the borders of India; for going to Kashmir to support an autocratic monarch. The House will remember that one of the conditions that we made at that critical moment, when we had to decide whether to send the Indian Army or not, whether to accept accession or not, one of the conditions was that there must be a popular government there, not as a goal- and an ideal, but immediately. It was an immediate thing and it was given effect to immediately in so far as it could be given effect to. So it is strange that this charge should be brought against us: Look at this charge in another context. Those people, men and women of Kashmir, who are with us and who are fighting for their freedom and liberty there, they are not newcomers in the struggle for freedom for the greater part of a generation, they have fought for the freedom of Kashmir, in Kashmir; they have suffered for it and some of us have deemed it a privilege to be associated with them in this fight for the freedom of Kashmir against autocratic rule. These people are with us today. Who are their opponents, who are against them in Kashmir or elsewhere? What has been their record in the past ten, twenty years in regard to the freedom of Kashmir? It is an interesting speculation and an interesting inquiry, because these gentlemen who talk about the autocracy of the Ruler of Kashmir, who talk about autocracy there, what did they do during these last ten, twenty years? They never fought for the freedom of the people of Kashmir; most of is them supported that autocracy; most of them opposed the freedom movement in Kashmir. Now, because of entirely different reasons, they have become the champions of the freedom of Kashmir. And what is the type of freedom they have brought into Kashmir today? The freedom so called that they have brought  into Kashmir is the license to loot and murder and burn that lovely country and to abduct and carry away the beautiful women of the Jammu and Kashmir State; and not only carry them away, but place some of them in the open market place for sale! So let us have this background before us when we consider this Kashmir story. It is a stirring background of events and many of us have been distressed at the strangely narrow view that people in the Security Council have taken on this matter. I do not desire to enter into the details of what happened or did not happen in the Security Council, but I do feel that this background must be appreciated. It is not a Hindu-Muslim question in Kashmir; it is not a question certainly of our standing for any autocracy or anything. We have already, during the last fifteen or twenty years, shown where we stand in regard to the States people and their rulers. In regard to Kashmir, more particularly, we have shown by our actions from the very first day we went there, from October last until today, and I shall have something more to say about it before I finish as to how we feel about the freedom of Kashmir. Now, Sir, I shall go into some slight detail about the events in Kashmir. The House will recall the statement I made on Kashmir on the 25th November, 1947. In that statement I recounted briefly the course of events in the Jammu and Kashmir State up to that day, the part played by the Government of Pakistan in these events, and our own objectives.

Our complaint against Pakistan was that it had incited and aid from outside and its own nationals to wage war on Jammu and Kashmir State. The month of December showed an intensification of military pressure on the State. Nearly 19,000 had been reinforced in the Uri area. 15,000 raiders were operating against the western and south-western borders of the State. Incursions by the raiders into the State territory, involving murder, loot and the abduction of women were continuing. The booty was being collected and carried to tribal areas to serve as an inducement to the tribesmen to swell the ranks of the raiders. In addition actively participating in the raids, a large number of tribesmen and others, estimated at 100,000, had been collected in different places in the districts of West Punjab bordering upon the Jammu and Kashmir State, and many of them were receiving military training under Pakistan nationals, including officers of the Pakistan Army. They were being looked after in Pakistan territory, fed, clothed, armed and otherwise equipped and transported to the territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State with the help, direct and indirect, of Pakistan officials, both military and civil. The equipment of the invaders included modern weapons, such as mortars and medium machine guns; the men wore the battle dress of regular soldiers, fought in regular battle formation and used the tactics of modern warfare. Man-packed wireless sets were in regular use and even Mark ‘V’ mines were being employed.

More than once, the Government of India had asked the Pakistan Government to deny facilities to the invaders, facilities which constituted an act of aggression and hostility against India, but without any satisfactory response. On the 22nd December, I handed personally to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in New Delhi, a letter in which the various forms of aid were briefly recited, and his Government were asked to put an end to such aid, promptly and without reservation.

As no reply to this letter was received for some days I sent a reminder by telegram on the 26th December. On the 31st December the Government of India instructed their Ambassador in Washington to convey a message to the Chairman of the Security Council of the United Nations. This message was a reference to the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations. On that same day, the full text of the message was sent to the Prime Minister of Pakistan by telegram.

On the 1st January, I received a reply from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to my letter, dated 22nd December. The contents of this letter revealed no helpful approach to a solution of the Kashmir problem. They consisted only of a series of fantastic charges against India, e.g., a determination to crush Pakistan, organized genocide of Muslims in India, and the procurement of the accession of Kashmir by force and fraud. This letter, even if it had been received earlier, could not have modified our decision to request the Security Council of the United Nations to ask the Government of Pakistan:

(1) to prevent Pakistan Government, personnel, military or civil, from participating and assisting the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State;

(2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State;

(3) to deny to the raiders (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; (c) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The House will remember the circumstances in which we had sent our forces to Kashmir. Kashmir State territory, that is, after accession, Indian Dominion territory, was being invaded to the accompaniment of murder, arson, loot and the abduction of women. The whole countryside was being ruined. Fresh raiders were continually coming from Pakistan territory into the Kashmir vale. All the fighting was taking place in Indian Dominion territory. The invaders had their principal bases across the border Pakistan, received supplies and reinforcements from them, and could go back there to rest and recuperate in safety. Our troops had strict orders not to enter Pakistan territory. The normal course to prevent raids on Indian territory would have been to deny the use of any bases to them in Pakistan. Since Pakistan was unwilling to co-operate thus in this manner, the alternatives left to us were to send our armed forces across Pakistan territory to deal effectively with the invaders, or to request the United Nations to ask Pakistan to do so. Any resort to the first course would have involved armed conflict with Pakistan. We were anxious to avoid this and to try every available method to find a peaceful solution. Therefore, the only course left open to us was to make a reference to the Security Council.

I shall not take up the time of the House with a detailed account of the proceedings of the Security Council; these have reported in the Press. I must confess that I have been surprised and distressed at the fact that the reference we made has not even been properly considered thus far and other matters have been given precedence. If the facts we stated in our reference were correct, as we claim they were, then certain consequences naturally followed from them, both in law and from the point of view of establishing peace and order.

On behalf of Pakistan, there was a repetition of the fantastic chargers against India which had been made previously in the letter of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to which I have referred. Pakistan refused to act at once, to deny assistance in men and material to our enemies in Jammu and Kashmir, to prevent further incursions through Pakistan into the State, and to ask the tribesmen and Pakistanis now in the State to withdraw unless a previous agreement had been reached and announced to the effect that the Indian Armed Forces would be withdrawn completely from the Jammu and Kashmir State, and the administration of the State would be replaced by another administration. There were some other matters in dispute also but the principal ones were the two I have mentioned above.

In effect, Pakistan not only admitted that they were aiding the raiders but made it clear that they would continue to do so till certain political objectives of theirs were achieved by them. This was a proposal to which the Government of India could not agree. For such an agreement would have been a betrayal not only of the people of Kashmir to whom they had pledged their word, but also a surrender to methods of violence and aggression which would have had disastrous consequences both for India and Pakistan. It was impossible for us to withdraw our forces without grave danger to the State and without handing over the people of the State who trusted in us to an unscrupulous and cruel invader who had already brought so much misery to the State and its people. Nor could we share the responsibility of protecting the people of Kashmir with any other outside force. It was equally impossible for us to agree to the replacement of Sheikh Abdullah’s administration by any other. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir is now no longer an autocratic government; it is a government representing the largest popular party in the State and is under a leader who, during these many months of unparalleled stress; has sustained the morale of his people, maintained an effective administration over the greater part of the State, and, generally, has inspired effective resistance to the brutal attempts of the invaders to overrun and destroy Kashmir. There is no alternative administration possible in Kashmir, unless that administration rested on coercion. If Sheikh Abdullah was not there by the will of the people, he could not have survived, much less could he have accomplished what he has done during these difficult months. It is for him to choose any national of Kashmir to assist him in his Government and it would be improper for us to interfere with his discretion in this matter.

I regret greatly that the representative of Pakistan before the Security Council should have made many statements and charges against India which have no foundation to fact. A great deal has happened in India and Pakistan during the last such months or more which has brought shame on all of us and I am prepared to admit at any stage and at any time the errors of our own people, for I do not think that it is good for the individual or the nation to lapse from truth. That is the lesson our Master taught us and we shall hold on to it to the best of our ability. Many horrible things have happened in India and Pakistan during these past months and while we hold strong views as to the initial responsibility for all the frightfulness that has occurred, all of us, in a greater or lesser degree, have a certain responsibility for it. But so far as the events in Kashmir are concerned, I am convinced in my mind than every action that the Government of India has taken has been straight and above board and inevitable in the circumstances. Our going there at the end of October was thrust upon us by the course of events. Not to have rushed to the rescue of the people Kashmir, when they were in dire peril, would have been an eternal disgrace, a gross betrayal and a deep injury. We feel deeply about this matter and it is not merely a question of political advantage or disadvantage. It has been and is a moral issue with us, apart from other aspects of the case, and because of this, at every stage and at every step, I consulted Mahatma Gandhi and had his approval. In the confusion of a welter of charges and exaggerated statements, the basic facts are apt to be forgotten. I should like to know from anyone who studies our record in Kashmir since that fateful day when the raiders swooped down at Muzzafarabad and started their career of rapine and arson, I should like to know what major step we took that was morally wrong.

The role of the Indian Army in this conflict, which I repeat was not of our own seeking, has been conspicuous for its discipline, impartiality, endurance and gallantry. They have extended their protection to every section of the people of the State. To suggest that should be withdrawn before complete order is restored is to suggest something which is neither practicable nor reasonable and which is further a reflection on the exemplary record of our forces in Kashmir. We are in Kashmir and our forces there because, legally, we are on unassailable ground. But even from law, the moral case of the Indian Union in Kashmir is equally unassailable. If we had not gone there and if our armed forces had not been rushed at great peril into Kashmir, that lovely country would now have been sacked, destroyed and ruined and its men and women who have been noted for ages past for their intelligence and their cultural traditions would have been crushed under the heel of a barbarian invader. No Government in India could tolerate such a happening so long as it had the strength to resist it with all its might, and if such a fate befell Kashmir, what freedom or security would we have in the rest of Indian

We have only two objectives in the Jammu and Kashmir State; to ensure the freedom and the progress of the people there, and to prevent anything happening that might endanger the security of India. We have nothing else to gain from Kashmir, though Kashmir may profit much by our assistance. If those two objectives are assured to us, we are content.

Our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith, because we believe in the progressive realization of world order and a world government. In spite of many shocks, we have adhered to the ideals represented by the United Nations and its Charter. But those very ideals teach us also certain duties and responsibilities to our own people and to those who put their trust in us. To betray these people would be to betray the basic ideals for which the United Nations stand or should stand. Even at the moment of accession we went out of our way to make a unilateral declaration that we world abide by the will of the people of Kashmir as declared in a plebiscite or referendum.

We insisted further that the Government of Kashmir must immediately become a popular government. We have adhered to that position throughout and we are prepared to have a plebiscite, with every protection for fair voting, and to abide by the decision of the people of Kashmir.

Our delegation has gone back to Lake Success after full discussions with us. They have gone back with a clear appreciation of the position of the Government of India and of Indian opinion and fortified with the knowledge that they have our full support. I should like to express my gratitude to Shri Gopalaswam Ayyangar and his colleagues for the ability and firmness with which they presented our case before the Security Council. Sheikh Abdullah has not gone back because his work lies with his people at this grave juncture. He has to assume a heavier responsibility. I feel confident that he will discharge this new responsibility with that strength and vision which have endeared him to Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in Kashmir. His place in the delegation has been taken by Shri Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, who has been a tower of strength to me during these difficult months.

I shall not say much about the military situation in Jammu and Kashmir. We have had our moments of anxiety but at no time have I had any doubt about our capacity to meet the enemy and defeat him. Our officers and men are in high spirit, ready to meet any challenge. We have good reason to be proud of our officers and men, both of the Army and the Air Force. In particular I should like to pay a tribute to Brigadier Usman, whose leadership and success have been in keeping with the highest traditions of India’s army.

The representative of Pakistan before the Security Council has brought in many charges against us which have little bearing on the Kashmir issue. He has talked of what he called our aggression in Junagarh and genocide and of much else. I do not wish to take the time of the House in dealing with these matters. We wish to conceal nothing and if the Security Council desires an investigation we shall welcome it.

Now, I should like to inform the House that today the Maharaja of Kashmir is issuing a proclamation and I shall briefly place the contents of that proclamation before the House, or I might as well read the whole proclamation:

PROCLAMATION OF HIS HIGHNESS MAHARAJA HARI SINGH

INDAR MAHINDRA BAHADUR OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,

THIS FIFTH DAY OF MARCH, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED

AND FORTY-EIGHT

In accordance with the traditions of my dynasty I have, from time to time, provided for increasing the association of my people with the administration of the State with the object of realising the goal of full responsible government.  In pursuance of that object I have, by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act of 1896 (XIV of 1896), established a constitutional government with a Council of Ministers, a legislature with a majority of elected members and an independent judiciary;

I have noted with gratification and pride the progress so far made the legitimate desire of my people for the immediate establishment of a fully democratic constitution based on adult franchise with a hereditary Ruler from by dynasty as the constitutional head of an executive responsible to the legislature;

I have already appointed the popular leader of my people, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, as the Head of the Emergency Administration;

It is now my desire to replace the Emergency Administration by a popular Interim Government and to provide for, its powers, duties and functions, pending the framing of a fully democratic Constitution;

I accordingly HEREBY ORDAIN as follows

1. My Council of Ministers shall consist of the Prime Minister and such other Ministers as may be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister. I have by Royal Warrant appointed Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah as the Prime Minister with effect from the 1st day of March, 1948.

2. The Prime Minister and other Ministers shall function as a Cabinet and act on the principle of joint responsibility. A Dewan appointed by me shall also be a member of the Cabinet.

3. I take this opportunity of giving once again a solemn assurance that all sections of my people will have opportunities of service, both civil and military, solely on the basis of their merits and irrespective of creed or community.

4. My Council of Ministers shall take appropriate steps, as soon as the restoration of normal conditions has been completed, to convene a National Assembly based upon adult suffrage, having due regard to the principle that the number of representatives from each voting area should, as far as practicable, be proportionate to the population of that area.

5. The constitution to be framed by the National Assembly shall provide adequate safeguards for the minorities and contain appropriate provisions guaranteeing freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.

6. The National Assembly shall, as soon as the work of framing the new constitution is completed, submit it through the Council of Ministers for my acceptance.

7. In conclusion I repeat, the hope that the formation of a popular Interim Government and the inauguration, in the near future, of a fully democratic Constitution will ensure the contentment, happiness and the moral and material advancement of my beloved people.

I am placing this Proclamation on the table of the House.

I should like to congratulate His Highness the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir on the decision that he has taken. But the burden now lies on Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues and the people of Kashmir. I have no doubt as to how they will discharge their burden, because they are not newcomers and we have seen them functioning in the face of all manner of difficulties during the last few months. So I look forward with a certain measure of assurance to the future of Kashmir in spite of all difficulties.

I am, Sir, also placing, a copy of the White Paper on the table of the House.

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