NEHRU’S speeches on KASHMIR

THE STORY OF KASHMIR GOES ON

(A speech delivered at the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, September 7, I948.)

From, Independence and After, A collection of the more important speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949. The Publications Division, August, 1949

SIR, I crave your leave to place certain papers on the table of the House and to make a statement thereon. These papers relate to the United Nations Commission on Kashmir which has been in India and in Pakistan for about two months now. The Honourable Members of the House must have read in this morning’s papers some correspondence which has passed between this Commission and the Government of India; a Resolution passed by the Commission some three weeks ago; the Government of India’s reply thereto and some indication of Pakistan’s reply. The full set of papers has not been published in the Press yet and in fact, we received them only this morning by special courier from Karachi. No doubt these papers will be published in the newspapers. Meanwhile, I shall place on the table of the House some of these papers, and the rest I hope to place there in the course of the day, as soon as they are typed.

Now, the House knows that this Commission has been here for the last two months or more and the House will have seen from this published correspondence what their resolution was and our response to it. In fact they will have seen that we accepted certain conditions for a truce and cease-fire. Pakistan, however, has rejected them. Now, I do not wish at this stage to say very much more about this matter, partly because I should like to go through those papers more carefully than I have had time to do this morning when they came, partly because the Commission is considering what further steps they may or may not take and it will not perhaps be quite proper for me to say anything which might embarrass the Commission.

As the House perhaps knows, it was the desire of the Commission that we postpone the publication of papers and any statements in this House till today. We have been anxious right from the beginning of these consultations with the Commission to take this House and the country into our confidence, because we wished to take no steps in such a vital and important matter without the full knowledge and consent of this House, but inevitably in the circumstances, it became difficult for us, much as we wanted to do so, to make statements in this House when the Commission was engaged in these delicate negotiations, and so at their request we had to postpone such publication from time to time. Ultimately, they issued their statement yesterday at 4 pm. in Karachi. Now, although I do not wish to say much on this subject, there are certain facts to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. The facts themselves are very well known not only in this House, but all over the country. Nevertheless, sometimes known and established facts are denied and it does make a difference when those facts are admitted.

The present story and tragedy of Kashmir began over ten months ago. Late in October last year there was an invasion of Kashmir by people coming across or from Pakistan territory, and the Government of India were faced with a very difficult problem, calling for a decision as difficult as any Government to make, and we had to make that decision within a few hours. We made that decision and since then we have followed that decision. It became clear to us then, and that fact has become clear to all the world that wants to know it that this invasion was not only encouraged and patronized but actively supported by the Pakistan Government. Later it became clear that apart from supporting others, there was active participation of the Pakistan army in it. Now, throughout these ten months the Pakistan Government have denied that fact, they denied it aggressively, loudly and persistently. We stated it before the Security Council of the United Nations.

In fact, we went to the Security Council with the very simple plea that the peace of Kashmir had been disturbed by these raiders coming across the Pakistan territory and we stated our case as moderately as possible, although we could have stated it much more forcefully. We said that it was inevitable that people from Pakistan could only come with the assistance and of Pakistan and, therefore, we requested the Security Pakistan not to assist them and not to permit them to come in this way. It was, if I may say so, a very moderate request, couched in moderate language. Pakistan denied that fact and during the long discussions before the Security Council they not only went on denying it, but expressed a great deal of irritation and anger that anyone should have made such a charge against them. Well, I do not want to go into this long history of denial by them, but the point is that today, on their own admission, their denial was false. Now, that is an important matter.

It is important from the point of view not only of practical polities and the situation we have to face today, it is important also from the point of view of the standards of morality, good behaviour and decency that should subsist between nations. Now, I know very well that the standard of public morality and international morality is unfortunately not very high in this world. Nevertheless, certain appearances have to be kept up, certain decencies have to be maintained and some standards have to be observed. I do submit to this House and to the country that the story, of these ten months and more and the way the Pakistan Government have reacted to all that has been said about them in the course of these ten months is so extraordinary as to be hardly creditable for a nation. Even till yesterday, as far as the world is concerned, even till 4 p.m. yesterday, there was no admission by Pakistan that they were participating in any way in those Kashmir operations. Of course, we knew. We have the most definite and positive evidence to that effect and ultimately you cannot hide large armies. Nevertheless, till 4 p.m. yesterday, when those papers were issued to the public, there was no public admission. In fact, there was a continual denial in the course of the last few weeks, while this large Pakistan Army was active in Kashmir, battling with the Indian forces in Indian Union territory.

Please remember that all the fighting that has taken place in the last ten months has been in Kashmir, has been in Indian territory; there has been no fighting; there has been no incursion, there has been no Indian Army anywhere on Pakistan territory. That is a fundamental and basic fact, which apart from any other enquiry and any other facts would lead one to the conclusion that if any outsiders are fighting in Indian Union territory, those outsiders are the aggressors. Why are they there? During the last six weeks or so, again we pointed out in the most explicit language to the Pakistan Government and to the Prime Minister of Pakistan this presence of Pakistan troops in the Kashmir State.

Again, there was either a denial or an evasion of the issue. It was an extraordinary thing to me. I do not claim to be in any way different from others of my kind. My standards, I hope, are not lower than those of others. It has been a shock to me that any country, any responsible Minister of a Government should make statements which are patently and obviously false and try to mislead the world by that means You will remember that before the Security Council at Lake Success, there were prolonged arguments on this issue. The Foreign Minister of the Pakistan Government, who was the Chief Delegate of their Government there, placed the case for Pakistan before the Security Council.

How does that case stand now, I would beg you and the country and the world to consider, because the whole case was one fundamental fact, that is, the denial of Pakistan’s complicity in Kashmir.  They denied throughout that they had actively participated in it.  If this fact is proved, as it has proved out of their very mouths today, to have been false, then what happens to that whole case so labouriously built up by the Pakistan Government before the Security Council? What happens to the charge that we brought against them which was never considered by the Security Council at all, much to our regret and amazement?  So the fundamental thing for us to remember is this, that fact which was denied for ten months and more has at last been publicly admitted by the Pakistan Government.  They have of course, admitted in their own way. I shall now read out some passages from their letter to the Commission. They say:-

“India was steadily building its armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir.  This building up process did not cease on the 21st April, 1948, but was continued and intensified. The Indian Army mounted a big offensive in the beginning of April, thereby causing a material change in the situation. This offensive action has continued ever since. The publicly declared intention of the Government of India was to secure a military decision in Jammu and Kashmir, thus presenting the United Nations Organization with a fiat accompli. This situation not only put in jeopardy the entire population of the areas under the Azad Kashmir Government, and led to a big influx of refugees into Pakistan, but also constituted a direct threat to Pakistan’s security. It was this which compelled the Government of Pakistan to move their troops into certain defensive positions.”

Observe here, too, they do not say clearly that the defensive positions happened to be in another country.

Quite apart from their decision in regard to cease-fire and other proposals, the country which participates in aggression against the neighbouring country, maybe in the name of defence or its own security, denies it for many months and then, in fact, when it finds that its guilt is proved, when it cannot hide it any more, then grudgingly admits it and gives some reason for it -- how shall we consider the politics of that country from any international or national or moral point of view? Observe that, according to this statement, they took this action in April last, four months or four and a half months ago. If they felt that their security was imperilled, or that something was happening which endangered them and that they had to send their troops, what then should they have done? Obviously, they should have informed the Government of India, and informed the United Nations Organization that this was happening and that there had been, as they say, a material change in the situation, and therefore they were compelled to take this or that action.

I cannot conceive of any country in the wide world which would not have done so. Quite apart from motives, this is the obvious and inevitable thing to do. They sent this army, according to them, in April last or thereabout and there is no intimation to us into whose territory they were coming, and there was no intimation to the United Nations Organization which was seized of this question, and was, as a matter of fact, then thinking of sending out a Commission to India. You will remember that in the very early stages of the Security Council’s activities, an appeal was made to India and Pakistan in regard to these military operations and in regard to avoiding any situation arising between India and Pakistan. That appeal was repeated. In the few lines I have read to you from Pakistan’s reply, they accused India of mounting an offensive. We are trying to push out the invader from Indian Union territory. It has been our declared policy, which we have repeated before the United Nations Security Council, which in fact was inevitable for us and would have been for any other country with any grain of self-respect.

On the other hand, what did the Pakistan Government do? We have, right from the beginning taken whatever step we have taken, in the limelight; there has been no hiding about it. The House has been greatly interested in this matter of Kashmir. The Indian public has taken the greatest interest in it and, rightly, the burden of it has fallen on our Government. It has been a heavy burden. I shall be frank and tell you why it has been heavy on me and more especially on my Government: not because military operations were involved, although that is always a burden, but rather it has best a burden since we wanted to be sure that at no time we acted against the principles we had so long proclaimed.

May I take the House into my confidence? In the early stages, towards the end of October and in November, and indeed sequentially, I was so exercised over Kashmir and if anything would or was likely to have happened to Kashmir, which according to me, might have been disastrous for Kashmir, I would have been heart-broken. I was intensely interested, apart the larger reasons which the Government have, for emotional and personal reasons; I do not want to hide this. I am interested in Kashmir. Nevertheless, I tried to keep down the personal and emotional aspect and consider it from the larger viewpoint of India’s good and Kashmir’s good. I tried to consider the question from the point of view of not straying or drifting from the high principles which we had proclaimed in the past.

When this question first came up, I sought guidance, as I do in other matters, from Mahatmaji and I went to him and put to him my difficulties. The House knows that that apostle of non-violence was not a suitable guide in military matters -- and he said so -- but he undoubtedly always was a guide on the moral issue. And so I put my difficulties and my Government’s difficulties before him and though it is not proper for me to drag in his name at this juncture in order to lessen my responsibility or my Government’s responsibility on this which is complete, I, nevertheless, mention this matter merely to show how the moral aspect of this question has always troubled me. And more especially, when I saw in India all manner of things happening, which had happened in previous months and had brought India's name into disrepute, I was greatly troubled and worried and was anxious that we should keep straight or as straight as we possibly could.

Now, this has been my attitude and on several occasions I had claimed it publicly. And apart from rhetoric and vague insinuations, I should like to know from anybody -- friend or enemy, from that day in the last week of October, when we took the fateful decision to send our troops by air to Kashmir till today, what is it we have done in Kashmir which from any point of view and from any standard is wrong.

I want an answer to that question. Individuals may have erred here and there; but I say that the Government of India and the Indian army as a whole have done something which was inevitable, and each step that we have taken has been an inevitable step which, if we had not taken it, would have brought disgrace to us. That is how I have ventured to look at this question of Kashmir: And when I find that on the other side the whole case that has been built up on what I venture to say -- using strong language -- is falsehood and deceit, am I wrong? That is what I ask this House and the country and the world to consider.

Now, therefore, this is the first fact to remember; that all this case built up by Pakistan before the Security Council crumbles by this admission of theirs and by the proven fact that large armies of theirs are active in Kashmir, and no doubt similar armies -- if you like -- and others connected with them have operated in Kashmir on Indian Union territory during these ten months or so. Every subsequent proceeding should be viewed from that aspect.

Now, we come to the present, and I must add one more thing. This has been an aggression; and if it is called -- as according to their own admission it must be called -- an aggression, then certain consequences ought to follow. Now, my difficulty has been that in considering any question if you lose yourself in a forest of intricate detail sometimes you lose sight of the wood for the trees. There have been long discussions over the Kashmir issue and every aspect and phase and the past and present history have been considered. But what has been the major point? I repeat that, because I think the fundamental factor is the aggression of Pakistan on Indian Union territory; secondly, the denial of the fact of that aggression; thirdly, the present admission of the fact. These are the governing factors of that situation. And the argument has gone on for so long, because these governing factors were slurred over and were not emphasized. We emphasized them, of course, and the problem was discussed in intimate detail.

Now, if you start from a wrong premise in an argument, obviously your whole argument goes wrong and you land yourself in difficulties. If you try to solve a problem without analyzing or stating the nature of the problem, how are you to solve it? And that has been the fundamental difficulty in this Kashmir business: the fundamental issue has been slurred over and by-passed and passed over. Therefore, we have been dealing with other matters which cannot yield a solution. Now, the basic factor is revealed by the very admission of the Pakistan Government.

Now, coming to this proposal of the United Nations Commission in India in regard to cease-fire and truce, etc., I shall not discuss it much, because I do not wish at this moment to say anything which might embarrass that Commission. But certain papers are before you. I need hardly say that the proposal they made was not welcomed by us with joy and enthusiasm; there were many matters in it which went against the grain. But we tried to look at the matter as coolly and dispassionately as possible with the view to establishing peace in the harried State of Kashmir, to avoiding needless suffering and shedding of blood; and we agreed to that cease-fire proposal after the Commission had been good enough to elucidate certain points which we had placed before them: We did not place too many points before them but only certain simple obvious points relating to the security of Kashmir. We placed these before them and they were enough to tell us that that was their meaning. Thereupon we accepted the ceasefire proposal, accepted many things in it which we did not like, because we felt that both in the interest of peace and of international order, it was a good thing for us to go a few steps forward even though some of the steps might be unwilling ones. We did so in order to bring about this peace and to show that we were prepared to go as far as possible to meet the wishes of an international organization like the United Nations.  The original proposal of the United Nations was given to us on the 14th August. The 15th was our Independence Day. Immediately after, on the 16th, we met the members of the Commission and discussed the matter with them to find out exactly what they meant and told them exactly what we meant to; and within four days, i.e. on the 20th August we sent them our reply. We did not want to delay matters as they were anxious that they should not be delayed.

The Pakistan Government had also received these proposals at the same time, on the 14th August, at 3 or 4 p.m. They also had the same amount of time.  But even after the return of the Commission to Pakistan -- and some members of the Commission went in between to Karachi -- they were not ready with their reply. And, in fact, it was by the pressure of events or the pressure of the pressure the Commission that ultimately they gave some kind of a reply yesterday. Meanwhile, they sent long letters seeking elucidation. I am sorry I have not yet read the reply wholly because I received it just a little before coming here. But I have read the significant parts of it, and in effect it is a rejection of those proposals.

Now, the Commission told us that these proposals stood as a whole and while they were prepared to discuss any matter gladly it was difficult -- in fact, it was not possible for them to accept conditional acceptances, because if we made some conditions and Pakistan naturally made other conditions, what exactly was accepted and by whom? So they said that these proposals were to be accepted as they were, and if there were conditions attached to them, it was not an acceptance but a rejection. Now, therefore, what the Pakistan Government have done is tantamount to rejection. It is for the Commission to decide and to say what they are going to do. It is not for me to advise them. So we have at a curious state of affairs that the country which was the aggressor nation according to its own showing, now even rejects and refuses a proposal for a cease-fire, or puts forward conditions which are tantamount to such a refusal.

Now, certain international consequences should follow from all this. What consequences follow? In a somewhat narrow sphere, all those officers and individuals who are participating in this aggressive war against India in Kashmir territory -- there are of course Pakistani nationals and others there too -- are participating not only in an aggressive war, but in a war after the refusal of a United Nations Commission proposal or a cease-fire. Their position is worthy of consideration.

That is all that I wish to say on the Kashmir issue. Naturally the story of Kashmir goes on. It has been a saga during these ten months or so, and there has been a great deal of suffering and blood and tears involved in it. There have been high moments also. But for us in India, and for the Government of India, it has been a period of trial and difficulty from many points of view; still, at no time have we considered that we were wrong or that we had taken a step which we could not fully justify. It is in that faith that we are going to continue, and may I say that in all these consultations with the United Nations Commission and in other matters affecting Kashmir, we have kept in close touch with the Kashmir Government under Sheikh Abdullah and consulted him in all the steps that we have taken? That was natural and it is inevitable in the circumstances that we should march together in full consultation with each other. Proceeding on that basis, we shall go ahead, whether in the military sphere other spheres, and I am quite convinced that, if we adhere the right course and do not stray from it, even from the opportunist point of view of some present advantage, we shall win through, and any country that bases its case on an essential falsehood cannot gain its ends.

NEHRU, ON KASHMIR From, Independence and After, A collection of the more important speeches of Jawaharlal Nehru from September 1946 to May 1949. The Publications Division, August, 1949

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